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United States Agricultural Trade:
Where Are the Gains?
Andrew  Schmitz
This paper discusses the interface between the U.S. agricultural  policy and the
economic gains from exports.  The theory shows that the net gains from trade after
government subsidies  are accounted  for can be small or nonexistent.  Some empirical
evidence  is discussed to support this claim. Policy options are presented  to enhance
gains from trade from U.S.  exports.
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U.S.  agriculture  in the  1950s  and  1960s  was
relatively  stable, but this situation changed  in
the  1970s  and  1980s,  where  trade  brought
about  a  greater  deal  of upheaval  for North
American agriculture.  In the 1970s export ex-
pansion  by the  United States  was rapid,  and
the export sector provided the engine of growth
for U.S.  agriculture.  The  1970s  boom  ended
with  the  1980s  crash,  where  export  demand
collapsed  and North America  found itself in
an excess capacity situation. The United States
attempted to deal with  this problem by low-
ering loan rates under the  1985 farm bill and
by  providing  additional  export  subsidies
through  the  Export  Enhancement  Program
(EEP).
The purpose  of this paper is to consider  fu-
ture  designs  of U.S.  agricultural  policy.  Op-
tions are discussed in the context of  gains from
trade theory within which the economic costs
and benefits that result from pursuing different
policy paths are illustrated. Often, trade theory
is totally neglected  in discussions of U.S. pol-
icy.  In  addition,  by linking  trade  to  the do-
mestic  sectors,  which  include  taxpayers  and
consumers, it is possible to highlight not only
the  economic  costs  associated  with  govern-
ment transfers  to producers but also the  con-
sumer  stake in farm  policy  design.  The  con-
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sumer  effects  are  often  ignored  in  policy
discussions.
The Closed  Economy  Case
Modeling the effects of agricultural policy orig-
inated in a closed economy setting where gains
from trade discussions are absent. Such an ex-
ample is the Brannon plan illustrated in figure
1. The  supply curve  is  S,  and  the  domestic
demand schedule is D. The competitive equi-
librium price is P, and quantity is Q. The Bran-
non plan proposed a target price of P,. At out-
put Q,, the market clears at consumer price Pc.
The  net cost of this type of program  is abd,
derived as  follows:  (a) producer gain  (PIabP),
(b) consumer gain (PbdPc), and (c) government
expenditures  (PsadPc). The important point is
that the net cost  of the program  is  small rel-
ative  to the  size  of government  expenditure.
This is because a large percentage of the gov-
ernment expenditure,  which results in a dead-
weight loss, is a transfer to domestic producers
and consumers.
Often there is a confusion over the meaning
of government  payments  and  producer  sub-
sidies. In this context,  the producer subsidy is
only PsabP, which is less than the  size of the
government  transfer.  The transfer also repre-
sents a subsidy to consumers.
The Slippage  Effect with Trade
As  will now  be discussed,  the  above  frame-
work takes on added dimensions once an open
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Figure 1.  Target prices in a closed  and open
economy
economy is considered.  Trade has to be mod-
eled explicitly.  Consider a Brannon-type  pro-
posal  in  an  open  economy  framework.  This
can be illustrated also in figure  1 by having D
represent  total demand  and Dd domestic  de-
mand.  Without  target  prices,  price  is  P and
output is Q; domestic consumption  is Q. and
exports are  QQ1. If a target  price  Ps is intro-
duced,  output becomes Qs.  Now note that the
net cost is no longer the triangle abd, but rather
it is the entire crosshatched area. The net cost
increases because part of the benefit from gov-
ernment expenditures  goes  to importers.  The
so-called  "slippage"  effect  is b'bdd', which is
the gain to importers because of lower prices
brought about  through both  higher  producer
prices and output as a result of producer price
supports. In this model, the greater the indus-
try's dependence  on exports, the larger the net
cost  of producer  price  support  programs.  In
other words, the slippage effect increases as the
percentage of production which is exported in-
creases. '
The above is the large country case which is
used throughout the remainder  of the paper.
If the small  country  assumption  were  made,
then  the  net welfare  loss  would  only be abe,
which is  small relative  to the  slippage  under
the large country case. This is because most of
' In this formulation,  only one exporter is assumed. As a result,
the  areas illustrated  in  figure  1 accurately  reflect the  gain to im-
porters from  target prices. If more  than one exporter is assumed,
then what the area under the net export demand function implies
depends on how this schedule is constructed. Under certain  spec-
ifications, importers would actually gain more than the area shown
implies  because  of the  loss incurred  by  other exporters  from a
target price policy in one of the exporting  countries.
the government  transfers go to domestic  pro-
ducers  since their increase in output does not
lower product price. As a result, importers do
not gain from domestic  target prices.
There  is  an  additional  point  which  is  the
effect of price supports combined with acreage
set-aside requirements.  Suppose S' is the sup-
ply curve with acreage controls. Now resources
are not misallocated since overproduction does
not occur.  The  government  cost of Psa'bP is
merely a transfer  to producers.  However,  the
latter are worse off by a'ab relative  to a com-
bined policy of target prices and uncontrolled
supply, but this loss is much  less than the net
cost (the crosshatched  area) without controls.
This latter result occurs because, with a com-
bination of target  prices  and output controls,
importers  are no longer being subsidized.
In terms of figure 1, the more elastic the U.S.
supply curve and the more inelastic  total de-
mand,  the smaller the  gain to domestic  pro-
ducers relative to importers from target prices.
Also, as exports become a larger percentage  of
production,  the relative gains favor importers.
It would  be easy to reconstruct  figure  1 such
that area PsabP  would be less than area b'badd'.
Government  Expenditures and
Gains from  Trade
The above model does not explicitly deal with
the  trade-offs  between  government  expendi-
tures  and the gains from trade resulting  from
the exportation of the good which is being sub-
sidized.  A model was developed by Schmitz,
Sigurdson,  and Doering  to illustrate  that  the
cost  of government  payments  to  agriculture
may well  offset  the  gains  from  trade,  hence
greatly  reducing  or eliminating  any  net gains
from trade using, as a norm, the standard free-
trade arguments.  This model  is presented  in
figure  2 and then extended to tie together ex-
plicitly the domestic and trading sectors.
In figure  2  the excess  supply curve  for the
export good is ES, while ED is the correspond-
ing  free-trade  excess  demand  curve.  Exports
are Q at a price P. In this context,  Pac is the
gains from trade for exporters (Letiche, Cham-
bers, and Schmitz).  Suppose now that, because
of tariff and nontariff barriers (e.g., quotas and
health regulations),  the  excess demand  curve
shifts to ED', and the exporter responds by a
subsidy which shifts the excess supply to ES'.
Exports  would  not change,  but now  the im-
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porter would pay a price P1 which is lower than
in  the  free-trade  case.2 Producers  of the  ex-
portable are unaffected but, to achieve this re-
sult, government payments of PabP, are need-
ed.  This area equals the gains from trade area
and,  hence,  the gains  from  trade  are entirely
offset by government payments to producers.3
Two additional cases are illustrated in figure
2 to  show  that  the  gains  from  trade  can  be
either  larger  or  smaller  than  the  size  of the
subsidy. For a given subsidy,  if the excess de-
mand shifted  only to ED°, production  would
exceed the free-trade level of output from QQo.
In  this case  the  gains from trade  exceed  gov-
ernment payments.  If, on the other hand,  the
excess  demand  schedule  shifts  to ED 1,  then
output Q1 is less than the free-trade output.  In
this case the gains from trade are less than the
government cost, implying that a no-trade po-
sition is preferred  to trade in the presence  of
distortions.
The gains-from-trade framework is now ex-
tended to deal with the effects of policy options
highlighting export subsidies and their appar-
ent costs. In figure 3 the domestic sector, along
with  the  trade  sector,  is  modeled  explicitly.
The U.S.  supply  is S,  and  domestic  demand
is Dd (for simplicity,  the  domestic demand  is
assumed to be price inelastic). The U.S. excess
supply  is ESus,  corresponding  to a  free-trade
excess  demand  curve  of ED.  The  free-trade
price  is P, and exports  are  Q;  domestic  pro-
duction is  Q 1 while  domestic consumption  is
Q2.
The  existence  of world  nontariff and  tariff
barriers shifts the excess demand curve inward
to ED' and,  because of domestic agricultural
policies, it becomes more price inelastic. With-
out  government  intervention  by the  United
States,  there  is a gains  from  trade  loss  mea-
sured by the crosshatched area. However, pro-
ducers  lose PefP 1,  which  is  greater  than  the
gains  from  trade  area,  but  consumers  gain
PP 1ga through lower prices.
Consider  now the  effects  of several  policy
options where governments attempt to lessen
the hurt to U.S. producers due to trade barriers
which curtail exports.
2 To derive the result, one  can assume that either the domestic
demand  curve  in  the  exporting  nation  is  price  inelastic  or  the
internal  price is held at the free-trade level P.
3 In the original Schmitz, Sigurdson, and Doering paper, the case
of price  supports was considered.  In this case smaller distortions
are needed to arrive at the no-gains-from-trade  result.
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Figure 2.  Trade-offs between gains from trade
and subsidies
Case I.  Target Price and No Controls
Consider the case where the United States sets
a producer  price  support  level at  the former
free-trade price P and output is maintained  at
the  original  free-trade  position.  This  clearly
results  in  a  misallocation  of resources  since
output increased  beyond  Q*.  However,  pro-
ducer welfare is restored to the free-trade level.
Note that, for the market to clear,  price has to
fall  to  Pc.  The  domestic  consumers  gain  by
gP 1Pcb. However, government costs now total
PPche. The net cost is the entire area ehbgf In
this case the net cost is roughly half of the total
government expenditure,  a much different re-
sult from the closed economy case in figure  1.
The outcome  is a function of the position of
ED (the larger the share of exports in produc-
tion, the larger the costs  and the slope  of the
excess demand  curve).
Why the large  cost? This is due to the  slip-
page  effect  discussed  earlier.  Importers  now
pay a much lower price than in either the free-
trade case or the trade distorting case without
U.S. government response. The importers gain
P1e'f'Pc as  a  result  of U.S.  government  re-
sponse to trade barriers erected by importers.
In  essence,  there  is  a transfer  from  the  U.S.
Treasury to importers.  Such a policy response
by the United States in response to trade bar-
riers is extremely beneficial to importers.
Case II.  Target Price and Controls
Consider the model in figure  3 where a target
price of P is set (given the existence  of ED')
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Figure 3.  Policy options in an open economy
and coupled with acreage  diversion such that
the  excess  supply curve  becomes  S'.  In  this
case overproduction  does not occur (Babcock,
Carter,  and Schmitz).  The government trans-
fers to producers Ph'e'P,.  Relative to free trade,
the producers  now only lose h'e'g'. However,
note  now the  effect  on  consumers.  Prices  in
both  countries  remain  at  P1. Hence,  unlike
above, consumers domestically and abroad do
not gain from producer price  supports.
In this case there  is no  net cost  as a result
of government  policy  since there is a one-to-
one  money transfer  from  the government  to
producers.  This does not result in  a misallo-
cation of resources  as measured  in the tradi-
tional sense.  However,  note that there is still
an economic cost involved. However, the cost
to the United States is due to trade distortions
which  shifted  ED to  ED'. In the  model  the
producers  share  part of this  loss  along with
taxpayers. The gains to consumers through the
consumption  effect  occurred  because  of the
trade  distortions,  not  because  of policy  re-
sponse to these distortions.
Case III. A  Consumption Food Tax
A great deal of discussion by Runge and Hal-
bach and others has been on the use of a food
tax to  support  farm  incomes.  Consider  one
aspect of this argument in figure 3.  Case I was
where producer price was supported at P with
no acreage controls. The government cost was
PehPc.  If  domestic  consumers  were  taxed
through raising the price of food (i.e.,  a tax of
gPcPb),  government expenditures would be re-
duced to PlgbheP. However, with inelastic de-
mand, there  is  no  net change  in the  welfare
cost of farm programs since there is a one-to-
one  transfer assumed  between losses  in con-
sumer welfare through higher prices and gains
from lower taxes.
The  interesting  point  in this  discussion  is
that, for the United States to gain from a food
tax, it also has to tax importers. A tax only in
the United  States  still leaves  foreign  price at
Pc.  This  is clearly  an  export subsidy.  In  fact,
relative  to the free-trade  position,  the export
subsidy is (PP,)(Q). What is needed also is an
export tax; however, as pointed out in Case II,
there is an  easier solution:  All  of this  can be
accomplished through the use of  price supports
and production  controls (Carter, Gallini,  and
Schmitz).
The  previous  models  highlighted  the  rela-
tionship between domestic food prices and al-
ternative  government  policies.  The  current
policy  (i.e.,  the  1985  farm  bill) achieves  low
food prices  but at large  treasury  costs.  A tax
on  food  clearly  raises  food  prices,  reduces
treasury  costs,  and adds to inflation. In addi-
tion, it taxes the poor because, with deficiency
payments, the tax revenue comes from people
who have income above minimum wages. Also,
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Figure 4.  Producer monopoly
even with a food tax, as pointed out, there still
can remain both a sizable treasury cost and a
net welfare  cost from the use of EEP and the
like. As illustrated, a policy is needed that taxes
importers while at the same time it holds food
prices  down  in the United  States.  Currently,
food prices  are  held low by providing  cheap
grain to both domestic  users and importers.
In  early  1988  fears  of inflation  once  again
echoed  through the  United States  and,  inter-
estingly, the rising prices of agricultural  prod-
ucts due to the 1988 drought were mentioned
as areas of inflation concerns.  This was espe-
cially true for soybeans,  as prices in May and
June skyrocketed.  Food security, price  stabil-
ity, and inflation weigh heavily in policy  for-
mulation.  Thus, to the extent that rising food
prices  add  to inflation,  the  costs  of the U.S.
farm policy are not as great as modeled in the
theoretical  section. There may be some trade-
off between low and stable food prices and the
higher  taxes  needed  for  financing  deficiency
payments in order to provide for these objec-
tives.
Case IV. Producer  Monopoly
Consider figure  4 where both production con-
trols and targets prices are once again in place.
A target  price  of P** is coupled  with output
restrictions which correspond to output Q3 and
Q** of exports.  This policy acts as a true food
tax  on both domestic  and foreign  consumers
since  prices  are above  the free-trade  level P.
U.S. producers  gain  relative  to free  trade by
P**mjP - ejy.  In the export market, there is
a net gain from exports ofP**jkP - klg. Thus,
the net gain to producers essentially comes from
price  rises in all markets.  The net gain in the
export  market goes  to  U.S.  producers  along
with  the  gain  in  the  domestic  market  from
higher prices.  Note in this model there are no
government  transfers to producers;  the policy
response to trade distortions is to raise prices
where  both  domestic and  foreign  consumers
pay  higher prices.  This model  generally runs
counter to real-world situations where the ten-
dency  is to lower prices in reaction to distor-
tions.
Note that producers can gain relative to free
trade  even given that they are pricing  on the
trade  distorted demand curve ED'. Also, rel-
ative  to the position where price  was P1 due
to  trade  distortions,  U.S.  consumers  lose  by
the crosshatched area because of tight produc-
tion controls. However, it is worth noting that
P** may be difficult to achieve unless the do-
mestic country's share  in the world market is
large.  If not,  other exporters  would also have
to  cooperate  in  output  reduction  strategies.
Otherwise, there is a free-rider problem.
In the above, an alternative would be to im-
pose an export tax. An  example  of a  specific
tax would  be  one  where  the  U.S.  price  re-
mained at P, and the export price at P** where
P**abP would  be  made  up  by  government
Schmitz
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transfers from taxes. Unfortunately,  however,
explicit export taxes are unconstitutional in the
United States.
The trade-offs between producers and con-
sumers  under  producer  versus  government
controls have been discussed in detail by Car-
ter, Gallini, and Schmitz. The general conclu-
sion is that, while  the distributional effects  in
the exporting  country  depend on the  type of
arrangement  (for example,  whether in the in-
terest of producers  or  society generally),  im-
porters are taxed rather than subsidized through
exporter cooperation  arrangements.
Example: The Wheat Economy
The various policy options outlined above are
now  discussed  with  reference  to  the  world
wheat economy, where the United States is a
major player.  Extensions have  to be made to
the models  to deal with  the complex reality.
The  United  States  is both  a major  producer
and  exporter.  It  is  the  largest  exporter,  fol-
lowed by Canada,  the European  Community
(EC), Australia,  and Argentina.  Major wheat
buyers are Japan, the Soviet Union, and China.
The 1985 farm bill was largely a reaction to
EC  subsidies  which,  in  part and  over  time,
resulted in the EC becoming a major exporter
where  at  one  time the  EC  was  a  major im-
porter. In the 1985 farm bill, the loan rate was
lowered. For producers to qualify for high tar-
get prices,  tighter  acreage  set-asides  were re-
quired. Prior to the 1985 farm bill, the United
States was holding the largest absolute amount
of stocks of any producer, and its wheat export
market share had dropped to below 35%.
In lowering the loan rate,  there was an im-
mediate  transfer of income  to the major im-
porters.  The U.S. export prices  dropped,  and
competitors  such  as  Canada  and  the  EC  re-
sponded by lowering export prices to meet the
competition.  In  addition,  in Canada,  for  ex-
ample, there was policy response by the federal
government  in  the  form  of deficiency  pay-
ments to producers to offset partially the drop
in price  due to the lower loan rate. In the  EC
the  government  made  up  the  difference  be-
tween  export  and internal  prices  through  in-
creased  restitution  payments.  All  of this  re-
sulted in lower  cost imports  for regions  such
as the Soviet Union and China. The same was
true  for Japan.  For Japan,  because  of its in-
ternal pricing arrangement,  the biggest gainer
was  the Japanese  Food  Agency,  which  buys
wheat  at the world  price  for resale internally
at a much higher price. In total, the major grain
importers, as the earlier models  show, benefit
from lower external prices and, as a result, are
not likely to lower tariff and nontariff barriers
in response  to U.S. farm policy.4
In addition to the drop in the loan rate,  in
the  1985  farm  bill  the  EEP was  introduced,
whereby  the United States  could sell grain to
certain importers even at prices below the loan
rate.  Although  Japan,  for example,  does not
qualify,  importers  such  as the  Soviet  Union
do. Major exporters  responded to the EEP by
also meeting the increased competition through
lower prices.  As the theory  suggests,  this  re-
sulted in an increase in the treasury costs and
an increase  in the net cost of U.S.  farm pro-
grams.
The  above data can be  discussed with  ref-
erence to figure  5. In free-trade equilibrium at
price  P1,  the EC was  a major importer along
with Japan and others. This is represented by
the excess demand curve ED; the excess supply
curve is ES, consisting  of the United States,
Canada,  Australia,  and  Argentina.  With  in-
creased  protectionism  by the  EC  and  others
(e.g., price support of P, for the EC), the excess
demand curve shifted to ED'. Corresponding-
ly, the EC became a net wheat exporter as sup-
ply shifted to S'. However, at a world price P,
the EC  has  to use  an  export  subsidy  in the
form of restitution payments of the crosshatch-
ed  area.  It was essentially the growth in pro-
duction in the EC and its size of export subsidy
to which  the United  States responded  in the
1985 farm  bill.
Consider now the effects, for example, of the
EEP.  This and  other programs  are  shown in
table 1. An EEP-type program causes (a) prices
to drop in Canada,  which hurt producers;  (b)
prices to drop in the EC, which imposes added
costs  to the treasury through  increased  resti-
tution  payments;  (c)  prices  to  remain  un-
changed in Japan; and (d) import prices to fall,
yielding gains to China and the Soviet Union.
The drop in the U.S. loan rate has the same
4 Often,  arguments  are  presented  that cheap  food  imports for
less developed countries  stifle economic development  because  of
low prices for internal producers. Such arguments are questionable,
however,  on  the  grounds  that  internal  prices  can  be raised  by
collecting a border tax on food imports and using the tax revenue
for  development  purposes.  These  countries  could essentially  set
up a Japanese-type food  agency to collect the added revenue from
the importation  of food at lower  world prices.  Internal  prices do
not have to be affected by the level of external prices.




Figure 5.  The United  States and EC as com-
petitors
directional  effect  for Canada and  the EC  but
is beneficial to Japan along with the other im-
porters listed.
Quantity restrictions can have a positive ef-
fect on both Canada and the EC. For example,
for the EC such action would result in a drop
in  restitution  payments.  They  have  a  detri-
mental  effect  on  Japan  and  other  importers
because  they now have to pay higher prices.
Free trade has a positive price effect for Can-
ada but a negative effect for the EC and others
(Carter, McCalla, and Schmitz). Thus, it is clear
why the EC does not support free trade under
the General Agreement  on Tariffs and  Trade
(GATT).
As the earlier models and table 1  show, while
EEP and the like cause harmful  effects  to the
EC, Canada, Australia,  etc., they are beneficial
to importers. It is apparent from the exporters'
perspective  (excluding the EC) that free trade
is optimal in aggregate (Schmitz  1988). Output
management, however,  is preferred by the EC
to free trade; and, as is shown earlier,  produc-
ers in Canada, the United States, etc., may also
prefer this arrangement (especially if  freer trade
is impossible). 5 Under free trade,  grain prices
to EC producers would fall. Under acreage set-
asides, the price need not fall. As a result, the
loss to the  EC from an  acreage  set-aside pro-
gram would generally be less than a free-trade
outcome where both price and production fall.
Realizing  Increased Gains  from Trade
The  previous  discussion  has  highlighted  the
key point: The importance of international ag-
5  If one expands  the model by  Bredahl, Schmitz,  and Hillman
on  import-export  cooperation,  it becomes  apparent  that,  when
governments  negotiate for the general good,  a free-trade solution
would  be arrived  at. Clearly,  if producer  interests dominate,  an
import-export producer cooperation arrangement could be achieved
but at the expense  of consumers.
Table  1.  Border  Price  Effects  from  Policy
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ricultural trade to a nation depends on the gains
from trade that are derived. These can be large,
small,  or even nonexistent,  depending on the
size of government transfers required to carry
out both production and trading activities. The
purpose  here  is  not  to debate  the  empirical
evidence on this subject. Unfortunately,  little
work on this  topic has been  done.  However,
on the wheat trade, the works by Schmitz, Sig-
urdson, and Doering; and Babcock, Carter, and
Schmitz suggest that the trade gains net of gov-
ernment transfers can be small, indeed, for the
United States. The concluding comments sug-
gest how these gains can be increased.
The  models  suggest  one  option:  Europe,
Canada, and others could join forces and cur-
tail production as has been attempted by the
United States essentially since 1983. What has
been  the  reality?  The  major  grain  exporting
countries have not explicitly done so. The op-
posite  seems  to be happening.  In  May  1988
(partly in response  to noncooperation  by oth-
ers), the United States announced that in 1989
it would reduce the wheat set-aside from 25%
to  10% for farmers who wished to participate
in the farm program. (The irony is that, in an
inelastic  price  market,  what  is not needed  is
more  incentives  for  production  unless,  of
course, droughts comparable  to 1988 reappear
in short-term intervals.)  This will have  to be
paid for by taxpayers through deficiency  pay-
ments,  where  the gainers  are  the  importers.
The EEP is used to encourage  export sales be-
cause  of excess  stocks, while relaxed set-aside
requirements  are  used to  encourage  produc-
tion,  which  in  turn  will  require  more  EEP
money  to  sell  the  added  production.  These
programs reinforce each other. They appear to
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be aimed  at market  share  criteria  and costly
competition  among  exporters  rather  than  on
economic criteria based on costs and benefits
including gains  from trade criteria.
There  are  many  dimensions  at  work  that
shape U.S. farm policy which make free trade
or  export  cooperation  difficult.  Consider  the
role  played by input  suppliers,  grain dealers,
handlers,  and the like. The so-called agribusi-
ness  sector  supports  the  planting  of  large
acreages  and promotes  large  export  sales  ac-
companied by price instability and subsidies.
For example, the decrease in set-aside require-
ments mentioned earlier increases the demand
for inputs,  while  the  use of EEP and  the re-
duction in the loan rate increases the volume
of grain handled by multinationals.  Thus, the
U.S. policy of high target prices, low loan rates,
and  minimal set-aside  requirements  may not
be in the general interest of the United States
even  when the food price dimension is taken
into  account, but it serves the interests of ag-
riculture  broadly  defined.  This  will  be  espe-
cially  true if U.S. policy  continues  with  high
target prices relative to export prices and lim-
ited production controls. Agricultural produc-
tion  will  become  truly uncoupled  from  con-
sumption. The net cost to many, including the
United States, will increase. The transfers from
governments  to agriculture  will also result  in
resource misallocation. In this case the volume
of trade may well be large, but the gains from
trade will be offset by the cost to the treasury
to keep agriculture and all the vested interests
afloat (Schmitz  1983;  Sarris and Schmitz).
The  theoretical  models  suggest  export  co-
operation,  not costly  competition  where it is
accompanied by huge treasury costs-a model
of competition  which is vastly different  from
laissez faire textbook  analysis.  Of course,  the
problem  remains  of how to  cooperate  effec-
tively because  of such issues as the free-rider
problem. Questions have arisen in the past such
as why  should the United  States cut  produc-
tion while other major exporters increase out-
put? On  the other hand,  there are  those who
contend that U.S. policy, even with its acreage
set-aside  provisions,  has not caused  a reduc-
tion in output.
Essentially, GATT is a forum for export co-
operation  through  multilateral  reductions  of
both tariff and nontariff barriers. However,  as
these  and  various  other  models  show  (e.g.,
Schmitz  1988),  the  potential  payoff  from
GATT may be limited not because the  gains
would be insignificant but because  special in-
terest groups may not want free trade to hap-
pen.  The  alternative  solution  to free  trade is
clearly production controls by all including the
EC.  However,  if the EC refuses  any form  of
cooperation, then the United States (along with
Canada  and others)  has to assess the payoffs
from cooperation  where the EC is given free-
rider status. The 1988 North American drought
can also be analyzed in this context.
[Received July 1988; final revision
received September 1988.
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